In P.N. Kaushal vs Union of India 1978, the Supreme Court has established that the policy of the law must be gathered from the preamble and shall be read in the light of the circumstances in which it is passed. The discretionary power of administrative authority shall be limited within the condition of its exercise laid down in the rules made under the Act.

Even when the legislature does not make effective classification and leaves it to be made by administrative authority the legislature in such situations law down the policy or the standard according to which the delegate must make the classification.

In State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952, the Supreme Court has established that where the standard or guide furnished by the statute is vague and uncertain it amounts to the absence of any guide at all and the law must be struck down as conferring unguided power upon the Executive to discriminate but where the standard offered by the statute is vague or not is to be determined upon an examination of the act read as a whole, the standard prescribed by the Act cannot be held to be vague to be gathered from the history of the legislation and the circumstances which prevailed at the time of its enactment, and to ascertain these facts, the court may take affidavit on the behalf of the state.

The above argument leads us to another question, whether denial of equal protection may take place in the administration of law?

In Kedarnath bajoria vs State of West Bengal AIR 1954, it was mentioned that equal protection may be denied not only by legislation but also by the administration of law. The principles to be applied where an administrative act is challenged should not be confused with those which are to be applied when the law itself under which the administrative act is purported to be done is challenged.

Where the law itself is not discriminatory and the charges of violation of equal portion are only against the official who is entrusted with the duty of carrying it into operation, the charges will fail if the power has been exercised by the officer in good faith within the limitation imposed by the Act and for the achievement, of an object of enactment, had in view, if, however, the person who alleges discrimination succeeds in establishing that the step was taken intentional injuring him, or in other words, that it was a hostile act directed against him, the executive act complained of must be annulled, even though the statute itself be not discriminatory.

Thus, it was established in Iron 7 metal traders vs Haskiel that when a law is challenged as discriminatory, the relevant consideration is the effect of the law and the intention of the Legislature but when a law is itself non-discriminatory but its administration is challenged as discriminatory, the question of intention of the administrative authority becomes material. The administrative action cannot be said to have offended against Article 14 unless it was ‘mala fide’ or actuated by a hostile intention as distinguished from mere oversight. Mala fide intention can be established where there is discrimination if the individual is signed out from several situations for hostile treatment.

To check out the offending order and established justice the Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay v Union of India 1986 has established that where an administrative action offends Article 14 by making a discriminatory application of a statute, by violating the policy or standard laid down by the legislature the Court may after quashing the offending order give proper direction as may be necessary to secure compliance with the standard laid down by the legislature or to remove the discrimination, thus taking an affirmative role in affording proper justice to the person aggrieved.